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Abstract

This paper analyzes the simplest neoclassical economy in which agents have finite
lives and there is sustained per capita growth. The growth rate of the world economy
depends upon countries' savings propensities and common technology. Trade can
reverse an economy's autarkic growth trajectory, and a country with a high savings
rate runs a current account surplus. If a surplus country expands aggregate demand
while a deficit country contracts analogously, world growth increases. An appropriate international policy can change the path of the world economy from stagnation
to growth.
Key words: Endogenous growth; Two-sector models; Overlapping generations;
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1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between economic
growth, trade flows, and policies affecting aggregate demand in open
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Henry Wan and J. David Richardson for their encouragement and two anonymous referees
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economies. Any investigation of these phenomena must contain three
elements. First, the economy under analysis must actually grow. Second,
there must be some heterogeneity in the model in order to generate trade
flows. And third, there must be a role for macroeconomic policy in the
development process. This paper shows that international policies promote
growth when they transfer wealth from countries with low savings rates to
those with high rates. In essence, transferring resources from spendthrift to
thrifty members of today’s generation improves the welfare of all future
generations.
The first piece of the puzzle involves growth. The economy described
below exhibits per capita consumption growth if the world savings rate is
sufficiently high. This economy has two sectors, the first producing a
consumption good and the second producing an investment good. The
growth rate is an increasing function of the savings rate and the marginal
efficiency of investment. Since there are constant returns to scale in each
sector,. growth occurs only if the relative price of the investment good
becomes arbitrarily small.’ Rebel0 (1991) described this economy for the
case of an infinitely lived agent.
The second piece involves heterogeneity. A country is a sequence of
agents having similar preferences, and countries differ in three ways. They
have different savings propensities, different absolute sizes, and different
initial endowments of capital. In equilibrium, thrifty countries run current
account surpluses and accumulate net foreign assets. Also, a capital-rich
country may have an initial deficit on the capital account, owing to an
outflow of investment that equalizes factor prices across countries.
The third piece of the puzzle involves economic policy and its affect on
aggregate demand. This paper assumes that countries impose lump-sum
taxes or transfers denominated in their own national fiat assets. In equilibrium, paper assetsbear the same rate of return as claims against capital.* If
agents in each generation have different savings rates, there is a class of
transfers that can actually turn a shrinking world economy into a growing
one. A country with a current account surplus expands domestic aggregate
demand, while the deficit country contracts analogously. A coordinated
policy keeps paper assets from crowding out real economic investment in
either country, thus promoting world growth.
There has been relatively little work in this area, although Jones and
Manuelli (1990) studied trade and growth in a model with infinitely lived
agents. In a classic paper, Gale (1971) first explored trade imbalances in a
’ De Long and Summers (1991) showed that a low relative prices of investment goods is
positively correlated with growth rates between 1960 and 1985 for a wide sample of countries.
* The model below is close in spirit to the classic one of Diamond (1965), although I allow
intra-generational heterogeneity and examine equilibria that do not converge to a steady state.

simple dynamic economy. Jones and Manuelli (1992) examined tax policies
in a growing economy with finitely lived agents, but they focused on
redistributions between agents of different generations, not different countries. In an elegant paper, Baxter (1992) examined the dynamic properties
of the two-sector model, but she analyzed steady states in a model where
countries are infinitely-lived agents. The literature on endogenous growth
and international trade is growing rapidly (see Grossman and Helpman,
1989; Young, 1991; and Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991, for examples), but
these authors study economies with increasing returns to scale.
2. Summary of the results

Although the model outlined in Section 3 seems special, it captures the
asymptotic behavior of any growing convex economy with finitely lived
agents, a point I emphasize in earlier work (Fisher, 1992). Such an
economy’s growth rate depends on only three crucial elements: labor’s share
in the economy, the marginal efficiency of investment, and the marginal
propensity to save. The economy described below exhibits balanced growth,
and the equilibrium allocations are efficient.
Section 4 examines the model for two open economies. It shows that
factor-price equalization occurs in finite time. World economic growth
depends upon the savings propensities in both countries, and the thrifty
country acquires net foreign assets in each period. Hence surplus countries
are precisely those with a higher than average asymptotic marginal propensity to save. Although I describe savings rates by specifying the agents’
preferences, one can think of these parameters more generally. In particular, any long-run policy that discourages consumption and encourages
savings will increase the growth rate of a closed economy. Under this more
general interpretation, a surplus country is one whose policies encourage
savings more than the world average.
Section 5 describes policies that increase world economic growth. These
policies are lump-sum transfers between members of the same generation,
and they do not crowd out real economic investment. I am tempted to call
these tax-transfers monetary policy, but there is no simple dichotomy in
models of overlapping generations between monetary and fiscal policy. One
can think of these policies instead as profiles of national generational debt.
A country runs an expansionary policy if it increases debt and suffers a
concomitant worsening of external balances. My main result is that any
institution inducing surplus countries to expand and deficit countries to
contract enhances world growth. A system of fixed exchange rates works
exactly in this way if foreign exchange flows are not sterilized. The current
practice of occasional economic summits among the major industrial (G-7)

countries serves to coordinate fiscal policies analogously. Section 6 presents
brief conclusions.

3. The model in a closed economy
The demographic structure of the economy is that of the model of
overlapping generations, with L agents per generation. The ‘old’ agents
alive at the beginning of the economy live for only one period, and each is
endowed with K, lL > 0 units of capital and nothing else. Each agent in
generation t 3 1 is endowed with one unit of labor in her youth and nothing
else. Each of these agents lives for two periods and saves some of her wage
in order to finance consumption in old age. Since the population is constant,
the development process entails per capita growth.
There are two sectors in the economy, and each is characterized by a
linearly homogeneous production function. The first sector produces a
perishable consumption good, and the second produces an investment good.
The production function for the consumption good is

where C, is the output of the consumption good, K,,, is the input of capital
into that sector, and L, i is the input of labor into that sector, all measured
at time t. The investment good is produced according to
4 = P&,2 9

(2)

where Z, is the output of the investment good and ZQ is the input of capital
into that sector, both at time t.
Since increments to an economy’s capital stock occur through investment,
the law of motion for the stock of capital is
K t+1 = (1 - SK + 4 7

(3)

where K, is the capital stock at time t, and S E (0, l] is the depreciation rate.
Investment is irreversible; hence, K,,, 5 (1 - S)K,.
The economy’s resource .constraints are
K,,, + Kr,2 G K,

and L,,, s L ,

(4)

which states that the supply of labor is constant.
Let h EZZ,, the index set of agents born at time t. Preferences are
summarized by the utility functions
u”(c:) = log c: , if h E H,, ,
and

(5)

where cp is agent h’s consumption at time t. The preferences in (5) entail a
savings rate that is independent of the interest rate.
Let P,,i be the price of good i, IV, be the wage rate, and R, be the rentals
rate, all at time t. We shall use the convention P,,, = 1;3 hence, all prices are
in terms of the consumption good at time 1. The present value of the income
of h E H, is
Yh=

R,K,lL,

w

1 f7

ifhEH,,
if hEH,,

with tal,

since each member of the initial generation is endowed with K,IL
capital and every other agent is endowed with one unit of labor.
Agent h maximizes
u”(4)
s.t. P, Ic; + P,>,k; s Yh ,
c:>O, and (l-S)K,lL+k:sO,

units of

(6)

if hEHo,

and

s-t. P,,,c: + Pt+1,d+I + (Pt,z - R,+,)k: + P,+,,&+l G Yh 7
(c:, c:+,> 3 (O,O), and (l-S)kF+kF+,20,

if hEH,,

tal,

where k: is h’s demand for capital at time t and the inequalities represent a
present-value budget constraint. The term (Pt,2 - R,,,) reflects the fact that
a ent h E H, rents out his capital before it depreciates in period t + 1. If
8
k,, r < 0, then agent h E H, sells capital in the second period of her life, the
situation one might expect when claims on capital serve as stores of value.
Firm i E {1,2} chooses K,,i. > 0 and L 1,1>
-- d to maximize

Pt,iQt,i- Wt., - RtKt.i .

(7)

Since production functions (1) and (2) are linearly homogeneous, firm i’s
profits at time t are zero. Hence the solution to (7) maximizes the present
value of a firm’s equity. Since labor is not an input in (2), L,,, = 0.
3Since there are two goods in this economy, there is no simple definition of the real interest
rate. The ratio P,,ilP,+I i is commodity i’s gross own rate of return, and a commodity has a
positive rate of return if its present price is shrinking. The law of motion for capital implies that
its gross own rate of return is 1+ p - 6, which is greater than unity if the marginal efficiency of
investment is sufficiently high.

An equilibrium

is a sequence of prices and aggregate quantities

(i) consumer h E H,-, U ri, solves (6);
(ii) firm i E {1,2} solves (7);
(iii> G,,I-1 c: + ChEH,c: s C, ;
(iv) resource constraints (4) are satisfied;
69 K+1 evolves according to (3); and
(vi) I(, > 0 is given.
Condition (i) expresses utility maximization, (ii) profit maximization, (iii)
the materials balances condition, (iv) the full employment constraints, (v)
the trajectory of the capital stockP and (vi) the initial condition.
If Q,,, > 0, profit maximization implies that

where k, 1 = K,,, lL is the capital-labor ratio in the first sector in period t.
Also, if & > 0, the wage rate in period t is

Since there are L workers, the economy’s wage bill is W,L.
Because of the special form of the utility function, the savings of an agent
born in period t 3 1 is uW,. As long as Pt,2 > 0, the equilibrium condition in
the investment goods market implies

where k,,, = K,,,IL is the economy’s capital-labor ratio at time t + 1.
We are now in a position to describe the trajectory of the economy.
Define the gross marginal efficiency of investment r = 1 - 6 + p, and let
G = k,, r Ik, be the gross rate of growth of the capital stock along a balanced
growth path. Then simple algebra as in Rebel0 (1991) shows that
G = max{J’cr[l - 6][~(1-

0) -t f3]-‘, 1 -S} .

(9)

Growth occurs only if both the marginal efficiency of investment and the
marginal propensity to save are sufficiently high. Furthermore, the growth
rate is independent of the initial capital stock. A large value of &IL is a
‘level’ effect; ‘growth’ effects depend upon the savings rate, labor’s share in
the first sector, and the marginal efficiency of investment.
4 Another way of expressing (v) is to state that EheCH,-,un,jk: G I,. Since ChEn,_,k: =
-(l - &)K, and Chexzk: = K,,,, this expression is equivalent to the more familiar K,,, s (l6)Kz + I,.

A convenient measure of the interest rate from period t to t + 1 is
1 + it+1 = c,l~pt+‘,‘~ the relative price of consumption between those
periods.5 Along a balanced growth path with positive investment, this rate is
1 + it+, = Z-/G’-” ,

(10)

for all t + 1. Eq. (1) implies that consumption grows at the rate G”. Since
G < r, 1 + i,,, > G’ ; hence, a balanced growth path is efficient.
In equilibrium, the consumption profile of agent h born at t 3 1 is

(11)
This completes the description of the model in a closed economy.

4. The model with two open economies
In keeping with the spirit of the Heckscher-Ohlin paradigm, I consider a
foreign economy with an identical technology but allow the marginal
propensities to save to differ between economies. I shall use the convention
that an asterisk represents a variable in the foreign country; for example,
1 - (+* is the foreign marginal propensity to consume and KT is the initial
stock of capital in the foreign country.
There are L domestic and L* foreign workers; let p = L/(L + L *) and
CL*= L* l(L + L*) be the relative sizes of the home and foreign economies,
respectively. Since the populations of both economies are constant, the
model captures only the effects of relative sizes of countries, not differences
in their rates of demographic growth. This is not a serious limitation because
the world economy will converge to that of the closed economy with the
fastest rate of population growth. Then an appropriate re-definition of the
rate of depreciation of capital could be used to describe per capita growth in
the world economy.
Foreign firms still have production function (1) or (2), but now the law of
motion for foreign economy’s capital stock is
K,*,,=(l-S)K;+Z:+Z,,

(3*)

where Zf is foreign production of the investment good and Z, is imports of
’ It is worth emphasizing again that this relative price is not the real interest rate in this
economy. It is the gross own rate of return on consumption foregone, and I use it in the
arguments below to state that the equilibrium allocations are dynamically efficient. A rigorous
demonstration of the dynamic efficiency of the equilibrium allocations uses two facts. First,
along a balanced growth path the limiting present value of the capital stock is zero. Second the
Gaussian curvature of each consumer’s indifference
surface evaluated at the equilibrium
allocations is bounded.

the investment good into the foreign economy, both at time t. Two
comments are in order. First, the two countries face the same rates of
depreciation. Second, since the investment good is traded, the rentals rate
will be equalized if there is positive investment in both countries.
The law of motion for the domestic economy’s capital stock is now
K t+l = Cl- 6)Kt + 1, - Z, ,

where Z, is production of the investment good by domestic firms and 2,
denotes exports of that good from the domestic economy, both at time t.
The foreign economy’s resource constraints are
K:l

+ K,:* G K,*

and LIT, G L* .

Labor is not mobile between countries, and the present value of an agent’s
wage may depend upon her location.
An equilibrium with international trade is a sequence of prices and
corresponding aggregate quantities

such that for each t:
(i) consumer h E H,- 1 U H, solves (6);
(ii) firm i E {1,2} solves (7) given factor prices in its own country;
(iii) ChEH,-, c: + ChEH,c: G C, + C:;
(iv) resource constraints (4) and (4*) are satisfied;
(v) K,,, follows (3’) and Kt*,, follows (3*);6 and
(vi) K, > 0 and Kr > 0 are given.
In such an equilibrium countries will typically trade the consumption good,
the investment good, and claims on capital.
The equilibrium for the international economy is that of the world
economy considered as an integrated system if and only if both economies
are incompletely specialized in the production of both goods or, equivalently, if factor-price equalization occurs. We will now explore the conditions
ensuring factor-price equalization.
Let ot = W,/R, be the domestic wage-rentals ratio at time t. It follows
from (1) that
k,,, = 0(1- 8))‘w, ,
where k, 1 is again the domestic capital-labor ratio in the first sector. Of
course, the investment good is infinitely capital-intensive for any wage’ Now the equilibrium condition for the investment good can be written as ChE(H,UH,-,jkf S
I, + Z: , which again reduces to (3’) and (3*), although it need not be the case that the domestic
demand for capital is met by sales from domestic residents and production from domestic firms.

rentals ratio since that sector uses no labor. Hence, the only non-trivial
pattern of complete specialization that can occur has the capital-poor
country specialized in the consumption good with the other country
incompletely specialized in both goods.’ This situation will indeed occur at
time t if the countries have sufficiently different ratios of installed capital per
worker.
Assume now that one of the countries is completely specialized. Then the
country with the lower capital-labor ratio will have a higher rentals rate
than its trading partner, and no investment will take place in the capital-rich
country. Now consider the evolution of the world economy. If the world
savings rate is sufficiently low, there will be no investment in either country,
the world economy will shrink at the rate (1 - 6 ), and the equilibrium is the
trivial one with both countries staying on their autarkic no-growth paths and
no trade in the world economy. Otherwise, all investment in the world
economy occurs in the capital-poor country, and that country’s installed
capital stock per worker grows strictly more quickly than does that in its
trading partner. Hence, in finite time the countries must have sufficiently
similar installed capital stocks per worker so that factor-price equalization
does occur. We have just demonstrated:
Proposition
factor-price

1. If there is any investment at all in the world economy, then
equalization will occur in finitely many periods.

Proposition 1 shows that the capital stocks per worker in each country
constitute an initial condition characterizing the preliminary phase of the
trajectory of the world economy. They do not affect the world economy’s
long-run growth rate.
Before stating the second proposition, I define two terms. First, k”,=
pk, + p*kT is the average endowment of capital per worker in the world
economy at time t. Second, C?= pa + p*g* is the average propensity to
save in the world. I can now state:
Proposition 2. Let factor prices be equalized in the first period. Then there is
an equilibrium with balanced growth, and the rate of growth is
(12)
Proof (By induction on t). Factor prices are equalized in the first period
only if W, lR, < 8 -‘( 1 - 0) min{k,, k:}. Since preferences are homothetic,
material balances imply that &V, = P, ,*( pk, + p *kz), where IV, is the wage
’ In other words, the diversification
that k, > O( 1 - fI)-‘w,.

cone is the entire half-space of capital-labor

ratios such

in both countries. Using (8), the fact that P,,, = R,I& and the expressions
for the wage and rentals rates, one can derive
6(1- 8)k,,, = (elp)iz )
where k, 1 is the capital-labor ratio in the first sector for both economies.
Since k”,jk”, = 1 - 6 + p(1 -k, ilk”,), this expression implies a balanced
growth path, with G = &2/k, given by (12). Allocate investment so that
G = k,lk, = k*,lkT, and note that
W,lR, = GW,IR, < GO-‘(l-19)

min{k,, kT}

= K’(1 - 0) min{Gk,, Gk:} .
Hence, factor prices are equalized in period 2.
Now assume that factor prices are equalized in period t. Then W,IR, <
O-l(l- O)k, and it+i/it is given by (12). But then Wt+llR,+l = GW,IR,.
Again, we can allocate investment so that k,,, = Gk, and k,*,, = Gk,* .
0) min{k,+,, k,*,,}, which implies factor-price
Hence, W,,, I&+, < 8-‘(lequalization in period c + 1. q
Since the investment good is traded, the equilibrium with factor-price
equalization has a degree of static indeterminacy. I used this indeterminacy
in the proof of Proposition 2, and it affects the definition of net foreign
assets and thus the current account. Although the distribution of wealth,
prices, and aggregate quantities are all tied down in equilibrium, the
location of the capital stock in each period is not. I could just as well have
described a cyclical allocation of the capital stock between countries as long
as I kept each economy’s installed capital-labor ratio in the diversification
cones as the world economy grew.
Although the location of the capital stock can display cycles, its ergodic
geographic distribution is determined because no country’s installed capital
stock can grow strictly more quickly than the world’s capital stock for
arbitrarily many periods. If if did, one country would be completely
specialized in finite time, as the arguments leading to Proposition 1
established. But such a situation is inconsistent with a perfect foresight
equilibrium since investment flows ensure that the returns on capital are
equalized. Likewise, no country’s installed capital stock can grow strictly
more slowly than the world’s capital stock for arbitrarily many periods.
Hence, the current account is not determined from period to period, but its
long-run average behavior is indeed well defined.
Proposition 2 and the analysis below assume that the installed capital
stock in each period is proportional to the amount of labor located in each
country. Thus there is no difference between the short-run and long-run
behavior of the current account in such an equilibrium. The indeterminacy

described above does not occur in a one-sector model with capital mobility
because labor is a fixed factor. Equality of rental rates between countries
ensures that capital is located in proportion to the workforce in each
country. Thus the equilibria we examine in this paper are the natural analog
of those in the Solow model, even though the two-sector model allows the
relative price of investment to decline as a part of the development process.
Now consider the direction of trade in the integrated world equilibrium.
Domestic exports per worker of the consumption good at time t k 2 are
x,=kfl , - (1 - a)W,lP,,, - (~TIG1-e)W,_,IP ,-,,, ,
where I have used (10) and (11). Since W,IP,,, = (W,_,IP,_, l)GB, x, =
8kf,,(l - (T/C?).Hence, the home country exports the consumption good if
and only if CT< Cr.We have just established:
Proposition 3. The country with the higher savings rate imports the consumption good in period t > 1.
Since the growth rate is increasing in the marginal propensity to save, (9)
and (10) imply that the country with a lower savings rate has a higher
autarkic interest rate. When the countries open for trade, the country with a
lower interest rate experiences ‘capital flight’, as its residents acquire foreign
assets in order to increase the return on their savings.
Gale (1974) describes a model in which the world economy converges to a
steady state and shows two similar results: first, the rate of growth of the
world economy reflects a weighted average of the savings propensities of the
individual countries; and second, the country with a higher savings rate
imports the consumption good in the long run. The intuition behind Gale’s
result is that the thrifty country will own a disproportionate share of the
world stock of wealth in the long run. Since the steady state exhibits no
further accumulation of net foreign assets, the country with a higher savings
rate runs a trade deficit and consumes the proceeds of its rental income.
In a growing world economy, each country’s share of world wealth
remains constant.* But, in each period, the country with a higher savings
rate accumulates a disproportionate share of the change in the world capital
stock per worker; hence, it runs a current account surplus. This implies that
the thrifty country finances its imports of the consumption good in two ways:
by exporting the investment good and by a surplus on interest income. In
the language of balance-of-payments accounting, the country with the higher
’ This fact contrasts sharply with capital accumulation
such as those of Becker (1980) and Baxter (1992).

in a model with infinitely

lived agents

savings rate may have a merchandise trade deficit, but this deficit is more
than offset by the surplus on investment income from abroad.
For completeness, I state
Proposition 4. Assume that the two countries have identical preferences.
Then the country with the higher capital-labor
ratio exports the investment
good in period t = 1, and there in no net trade in period t > 1.
Proof. Since (T = 8, 6 = u; hence, x, = 0 for all t 5 2. Since the members
of generation t = 1 have identical preferences and factor prices are equalized, per capita demand for the consumption good is identical for all h E H, .
Hence, for t = 1, x, > 0 if and only if k, > k: , since agents h E H, demand
only the consumption good. q

The capital-rich country exports the capital-intensive good in the first
period if preferences are identical. This is the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem,
and it shows that initial conditions for the world economy are actually ‘level’
effects, not growth effects.’ Proposition 4 suggests that one can think of
exports of the investment good as analogous to the outflow of capital.
Hence, the capital-rich country has a current account deficit and loss of net
foreign assets, representing an adjustment of the stocks of capital and
equalizing the rate of return on investment in the two countries. This occurs
in the initial stage of the world economy.
The most striking implication of these propositions is that trade can
reverse an autarkic growth trajectory. This result follows immediately from
the observation that u may be such that the domestic economy will grow,
but G may be sufficiently small so that the world economy will not grow. In
particular a small thrifty economy may well export the investment good to a
large spendthrift partner, thus precluding the possibility of growth.
Of course, the change in the growth rate resulting from opening an
economy to trade influences both the wage rate and the interest rate. For
agent in generation t 2 1, the preferences described by (5) entail the indirect
utility function:

V(l+ir+l,VPt,,)=m~pt,lw
+ir+tr.
Hence, an increase in the real wage or the interest rate raises the welfare of
any such agent. Since the transition from autarky to free trade may harm a
member of generation 0 in order to benefit members of later generations,
9 Recall that I have assumed throughout the analysis that the installed capital stock in each
period is proportional to the amount of labor in each country. Without this assumption the
static indeterminacy discussed in the paragraph below Proposition 2 occurs here too.

the autarkic path and that of free trade may not be Pareto ranked.
However, since 1 + i,,, > 0 in any equilibrium, infinitely many agents will
benefit from a transition to a higher growth rate, no matter what happens to
the interest rate when an economy opens for trade.

5. International economic policies and growth
Assume now that each government can levy lump-sum taxes and transfers
on the agents located in its economy. Let b: be such a transfer imposed by
the domestic government at time t on domestic h E H,-, U H,. If b: < 0,
then h is taxed by her government, and if b: > 0, then h receives a subsidy.
The present value of the income of domestic h E H, is now
yh =

R,K,
JL+f’,,,b:,

ifhEH,,

Wt+P,,bb:+P,+,,bb:+l,

ifhEH,,witht>l,

where Pl,b is the present price of the tax or subsidy imposed by the domestic
government at time t. An analogous expression is true for foreign residents,
with Prb. being the present price of taxes bz*h levied abroad. I am using the
formalism that the present price of these transfers need be defined in order
to interpret them as receipts or taxes denominated in two different fiat assets
in the discussion below.
I am now in a position to state an important result.
Theorem. Assume that preferences and technologies are such that one
country will grow in an autarkic equilibrium. Then there is an international
economic policy such that the world economy will grow.
Proof. If the world savings rate ~7is such that G > 1, then the theorem is
true using the policy b: = 0 for all domestic h E H,, and (b:, b:+,) = (0,O)
for all domestic h E H, with t > 1, with the analogous trivial policy for
foreign residents.
Now assume that Cr is such that the growth rate given in (12) satisfies
G < 1. Without loss of generality, assume that the home country has a
sufficiently high savings propensity so that it grows at rate G > 1 in autarky.
Pick GE (1, G), and let Pt,b = P,+l,b = Pb and Pt,b* = Pr+l,b* = Pb*, where
Pb and Pb* are strictly positive constants. Since the growth rate given in (12)
is a continuous and monotonic function of 6, there is an (YE (0,l) such that
a world economy consisting of proportions CY= LI(L + L*) of domestic
agents and cz* = 1 - (Y of foreign agents would grow at rate G.
Let D, be the set of domestic agents and F, be the set of foreign agents,

both born at time t. Now consider an international economic policy such
that b:=O for hED,, bFh=O for hEF,, and

c P,(bF
+bF+,)
=- c P,*@Y
+b,*,*)
>0
hED,

hEF,

for all t 3 1. Since factor-price equalization occurs in the economy with no
tax transfers and since this transfer lowers the initial wage-rentals ratio,
factor prices will still be equalized. Thus for any W, = v, we may choose
b: + e+1 so that the relative share of world income accruing to domestic
residents in each period is (Y.
In particular, let IV, be the initial wage in a non-monetary economy
growing at rate G. Then the monetary policy b: = 0 for h E D,, bFh = 0 for
h E F,, (b:, bF+,) = (0, (a - ~)(W1l@b)(Glr)‘-‘)
for h ED, with t 3 1, and
(bTh, b,*,h,)= (0, (a* - ~*)(W*ICL*P~*)(G/T)‘-‘)
for h EF, with t2 1 will
induce the necessary transfer. Moreover, the present value of each foreign
agent’s income is strictly positive. Hence, this policy supports an equilibrium
such that the world economy grows at rate G > 1. Cl
The economic policy described in the theorem has at least two interpretations. The one I favor is that the theorem describes the distribution of
seigniorage in the creation profiles of national debt.” This interpretation
implies that the two fiscal or monetary authorities cooperate. The surplus
country expands aggregate demand, increases world growth, and lowers
international interest rates. The deficit country absorbs the excess international reserves created by its trading partner in order to keep financial assets
from ‘crowding out’ real international investment. Using the jargon of
balance-of-payments accounting, we may say that the surplus country runs
an expansionary policy, while its trading partner contracts and accumulates
foreign exchange reserves. The theorem describes an economy where
growth is accomplished by direct foreign investment, with the surplus
country purchasing a share of the capital located abroad.
One could also interpret the policy described in the theorem as foreign
aid. Direct transfers from a spendthrift donor to a thrifty recipient increase
growth in both countries. Even though the two countries’ marginal efficiencies of investment are identical, the propensity to save may be higher in the
recipient country. Several initial generations in the donor country may be
lo The fact that the present prices of the two assets are arbitrary positive constants is Kareken
and Wallace’s (1981) celebrated indeterminacy result. In the context of this paper, it shows that
the rates of return (in terms of consumption foregone) of paper assets and of claims against
capital are equalized. In earlier work (Fisher, 1990), I showed that these kinds of debt profiles
can give rise to arbitrary transfers of resources between countries in exchange economies. I
have also demonstrated that a positive stock of world debt crowds out real economic investment
and slows the economy’s underlying growth rate (Fisher, 1993).

hurt by the tax, but the transfer will increase the real wage of infinitely many
future generations in both countries.
The different interpretations of the theorem show that it describes, in
essence, the effects of national aggregate demand on the growth rate of the
world economy. I have been careful to analyze policies that neither distort
intertemporal prices nor explicitly redistribute income between generations
by running global generational surpluses or deficits. We may conclude that
policies increasing aggregate demand in surplus countries without crowding
out real economic investment have a positive effect on the growth rate of
the world economy. This conclusion is general because the functional forms
used above capture the asymptotic properties of a wide class of economies.

6. Conclusion
I have examined a model in which the growth rate of the world economy
is influenced by economic policy. Analyzing lump-sum tax transfers makes it
easy to find closed-form solutions describing the growth path of the world
economy. Moreover, the policy described in the theorem induces efficient
equilibrium allocations. Coordinated international policies allow governments to choose Pareto-optimal sequences of equilibrium allocations, and
the role for policy in this model is quite different from the usual analysis of
capital income taxation, with all its distortions in growing economies.
The reader might feel uncomfortable with my first interpretation of the
policy in the theorem since it entails that some countries create a negative
stock of national debt. It is more natural to think of a change in the status
quo with positive stocks of debt in every country. Increasing the stock of any
national debt slows down the rate of growth of the world economy and
transfers resources from generations not yet born to those alive today. Such
a policy may be Pareto-efficient, but giving resources to agents with low
savings rates is a sure-fire way to slow world growth.
An important implication of this paper is that policies promote growth to
the extent that they create seigniorage in countries where savings is
encouraged. The specie-flow mechanism enforces exactly this kind of
adjustment in a system of fixed exchange rates. Moreover, if we think of the
instruments described in Section 5 as monetary policies, they are the only
ones that redistribute resources from one country to another without
crowding out real economic investment. This paper, then, has shown that
the distribution of seigniorage in any international monetary system will
affect world growth. Perhaps this observation will spur further interest in
models of growth in which monetary or fiscal policy plays an explicit
role.
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